Following Israel's airstrikes on Iran, state media in the Islamic Republic and sources close to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) are attempting to downplay the scale of the operation, claiming it was unsuccessful.
While Israel reports that at least 20 military sites were effectively hit during a three-phase operation early Saturday morning, Iranian official sources categorically deny the IDF's claims that over 100 fighter jets participated in the attack, labeling these reports as "Israeli propaganda." They also inform Iranians that Israeli leaders were in bunkers during the attack, allegedly fearing potential Iranian retaliation.
Fatemeh Mohajerani, the spokesperson for the Iranian government, characterized the damage from the airstrikes as "limited" and stated that "the situation is normal."
Israel considered U.S. opinion
As Washington desired, Israeli leader Benjamin Netanyahu appears to have opted for a rather limited series of retaliatory strikes on conventional military targets.
Nuclear facilities and oil installations were considered potential targets for the Israeli response, but in mid-October, U.S. President Joe Biden's administration received assurances from Israel that it would not strike such targets, which would constitute a more serious escalation of the conflict.
Now, the United States is warning Iran against its own retaliatory actions, indicating that the nighttime strikes should put an end to direct confrontation between Israel and Iran.
American media previously noted that if Israel's response remains limited, Iran is likely to refrain from retaliatory measures. The New York Times also reported that Iranian officials clarified they would respond only if Israeli attacks resulted in significant destruction and casualties; however, if Israel limits its strikes to a few military bases and warehouses for missiles and drones, Iran may prefer not to take any retaliatory actions.
How is Iran responding to the strikes?
Iran finds itself in a precarious position, particularly given that its regional proxy forces, especially Hezbollah in Lebanon, are significantly weakened. The regime acknowledges, at least in private, that it lacks the military capability to match Israel, which receives billions of euros in military aid from the U.S. annually.
While it is unlikely that Iran will officially renounce its right to retaliate, an immediate response does not seem to align with its strategic interests.
In the short term, Iranian media and state television are likely to emphasize a "victory," downplaying or even dismissing certain aspects of Israel's retaliatory strike as "fake news." The Iranian regime will probably conceal any damage inflicted on ballistic missile production facilities or drone manufacturing plants, using the limited and possibly coordinated nature of Israel's retaliatory actions to manage the situation.
Concealing information is not new in Iranian politics, with numerous examples such as the downed Ukrainian plane or Israel's response to Iran's initial attack in April 2024. Regarding the Israeli attack on a site in Isfahan, just a few days ago, a senior IRGC commander acknowledged for the first time that this strike had taken place.
Will there be an escalation of violence or can the crisis be averted?
While Iran is expected to maintain the rhetoric of a potential response, it is likely to stick to a fragile balance between escalation and de-escalation of tensions.
Additionally, it is important to remember that the upcoming U.S. elections, less than ten days away, will significantly influence the future policies of both Iran and Israel, and it seems unlikely that the White House will allow tensions to escalate in the remaining days.
However, the influence of those who benefit from sanctions and hardliners within Iran's ruling circles, who view full-scale conflict as the only path to political survival, should not be underestimated.